Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1977

J.O. Kingston v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance
Company, A Corporation: Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Carl E. Kingston; Attorney for Plaintiff and AppellantTimothy R. Hanson; Attorney for Defendant
and Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Kingston v. Great Southwest Fire, No. 15323 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/751

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF C'TAH

J. O. KINGSTON,

Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No. 15323

vs.
SOUTHWEST FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporaticn,

GREAT

Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appeal from the Judgment of the Third :9istrict Court
in and for Salt Lake County
Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Judge

HANSON, RUSSON,
HANSON & DUNN
Timothy R. Hanson
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Defendant
and Respondent
CARL E. KINGSTON
53 West Angelo Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
lt.torney for Plaintiff
and Appella.nt

Fi LED
NOV -7 ·1977

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CTAH

J. 0. KINGSTON I

Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No. 15323

vs.
GREAT SOUTHWEST FIRE

INSURANCE COMP ANY, a
corporation,
Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County
Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Judge

HANSON, RUSSON,
HANSON & DUNN
Timothy R. Hanson
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Defendant
and Respondent
CARL E. KINGSTON
53 West Angelo Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
~t:_i:Qrney for Plaintiff
3-'"'.d ·~-rpc:llant

-------

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
•

ii

ST,i\TUTES CITED

iii

CASES CITED.

OTHER .<\UTHORITIES.

iv

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE.

1

ST.<\TEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUl•!ENT

4

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF HAD
NO INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE WAREHOUSE
,<\T THE TIME OF LOSS .
A.

B.

4

After Possession Is Granted To The
Condemning Authority And Tender Is
Made Pursuant To Utah Eminent Domain Procedure, An Owner Loses Any
Insurable Interest In The Condemned
Property . • • • •
The Authorities Cited By Plaintiff
Are Generally Distinguishable Upon
The Facts Or Statutory Laws.

CONCLUSION .

.

.

.

.

.

4

19
27

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

CASES CITED

American National Bank &
Chicago vs. Reserve
38 Ill. App.2d 315,
(1962). . • . .

Trust Company of
Insurance Company,
187 N.E.2d 343
. . . . . . . . .

Chester Litho., Inc. vs. Palisades Interstate Park Commission, 317 N.Y.S.2d
761 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1971) . . . • . . .

13,

j:

City of Rochester v. Greenberg, 244 N.Y.S.2d
422 (Sup. Ct. 1963) • .
. •...
City of Silverton v. Porter, 559 P.2d 1297
(Ct. App. Ore. 1977). •
. ...
Cook's Adm'r. v. Franklin Fire Insurance
Company, 224 Ky. 360, 6 S.W.2d 477.
Fenter v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 258 Or. 545, 484 P.2d
310 (1971) • . • . • • • • . . .
Hill v. Safeco Insurance Company, 22 Ut.2d
96, 448 P.2d 915 (1969) . . . .

24, 1'

•

•

0

•

6 I 17 / j:
19, 1

Home Insurance Co. v. Dalis, 206 Va. 71,
141 S .E. 2d 7 21 (1965) .
. • · · ·
Irwin v. Westchester Fire Insurance C~.,
58 Misc. 441, 109 N.Y.S. 612, affd.
without op. 133 App. Div. 920, 118
N.Y.S. 1115, affd. without op. 199
N.Y. 550, 93 N.E. 376 . . . . . .
. . · · ·
Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial District
Court, 511 P.2d 739 (Utah 1973) .

. ...

Johnson v. Climax Molybdenum Company, 124
P.2d 929

(Colo.

1942)

.

.

.

.

.

.

)'.

·

· · ·

Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 176 P.2d 882, 885
..
(Utah 1947) .
. ....

...

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ii

CASES CITED, CONT'D.
Page
National Farmers Union Property and
casualty Company v. Thompson, 4 Ut.2d
7, 286 P.2d 249 (1955) • • • • •

6, 21
22 I 26

North Salt Lake v. Saint Joseph Water and
Irrigation Company, 233 P.2d 577
(Utah 1950) • • • • • • • • • • •

15

Patrick v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 413 S.W.2d 340 (Ct.
App. Ky. 1967). • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • 5, 11, 18
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v.
Mitsui Investment Inc., 522 P.2d
1370 (Utah 1974).

8

Rosenbloom v. Mary land Insurance Company,
258 App. Div. 14, 15 N.Y.S.2d 304

23

Salt Lake City Corporation v. J. 0.
Kingston, et al., No. 228991 • •

2

Stuart v. Commerce Insurance Company
of Glen Falls, N.Y., 114 Ut. 278
198 P.2d 467 . • • • • • • • • .

2Q I

21

Van Cure v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Company, 253 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1969).

13 I

16

STATUTES CITED
31-19-4,

u. c.

A.

(1953)

5

78-34-1,

u. c.

A.

(1953)

7

c.

A.

(1953)

7

u. c.

A.

(1953)

7

78-34-6, u.
78-34-9,
78-14-11,

u. c.

A.

8

(1953)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iii

STATUTES CITED, CONT'D.

78-34-15, U. C. A.

(1953).

78-34-16, U. C. A.

(1953).

OTHER AUTHORITIES
30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain, Section 339,
p. 271 . • . . • • . . • • . . . •

. . ...

California Law Review Committee Recommendation and Study Relating to
Taking Possession and Passage of
Title in Eminent Domain Proceedings,
October, 1960, p. B-17 . . . • . . . .

iv
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'

IO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

J. 0. KINGSTON

I

Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No. 15323

vs.
GREAT SOUTHWEST FIRE

INSURANCE COMPANY, a

corporation,
Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiff insured against
the defendant insurance company alleging that defendant wrongfully failed to compensate plaintiff for a fire loss to a ware-

house located in Salt Lake City.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Both sides stipulated to the facts and the case was submitted to the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, District Judge for the
Third Judicial District.

The Court ruled that plaintiff did

nQt have an insurable interest in the warehouse at the time of
t:,e fire and therefore

gr:anted judgment in favor of de f en d ant.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Crcfendant-respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1971 plaintiff, J. 0. Kingston, purchased a builfac
located at 9th South and 8th West for approximately $34 ,oou,
(Deposition of J. O. Kingston taken April 13, 1977, pp. H
This purchase price included both the building and the grou:.
(Deposition, p. 8).

It was used as a general warehouse for

products handled by Mr. Kingston.

(Deposition, p. 8).

Defendant-respondent, Great Southwest Fire Insurance
Company, issued a policy of fire insurance in the total
amount of $20, 000 providing fire insurance coverage for thE
warehouse building with effective dates of May 10, 1975 to
May 10, 1976.

(R.

I

p. 8 8) •

On July 3, 19 7 5 Salt Lake City Corporation commenced a
condemnation action pursuant to a resolution by the Salt Lai'
City Commission against plaintiff, J. O. Kingston and others
to condemn the property and building in question for the pur·
pose of erecting a Senior Citizen's Center.

The actioowu

entitled Salt Lake City Corporation v. J. O. Kingston, e,1:.!!
No. 228991.

(R., p.

88; Ex. A).

Summons on July 14, 1975.

Kingston was served with

(Ex . A. , p. 15) .

On the 30th day of July, 1975, Salt Lake City corporat::
filed its Motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy
Premises.

(Ex. A, pp. 24-27).

0f

·he
'

Attached to the Motion was

termined the
an affidavit of a real estate appraiser who de
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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value of the property to be $33, 000.

(Ex. A, pp. 26-27).

on August 12, 1975 an Order for Immediate Occupancy was
granted by the Honorable Bryant Croft permitting the City to
occupy the premises and:
. . . to take immediate possession of said
property of Defendant as required and as
described and as set out in Plaintiff's
complaint, and to continue the possession
of the same pending hearing and trial on
the issues that may be raised in this action, and to do such work thereon as may
be required for the purposes for which said
premises are sought to be condemned and according to the nature thereof.
(Ex. A, pp.
30-33).
In addition, the Order of Immediate Occupancy required the
City to deposit at least 75 per cent of the appraised value

of defendant's property with the Clerk of the Court and in

addition restrained Kingston from hindering or interfering
with the occupation of the premises.

Accordingly, the City

deposited 100 per cent of the appraised value of $33, 000.
(R., p. 89;

Ex. A, p. 33).

Approximately 38 days later a fire occurred at the warehouse and the building was totally destroyed.

{R.,p.89).

At the time of the fire plaintiff Kingston had certain materials in the warehouse which were not insured under the policy
in question.

(R., p. 89).

Plaintiff contested the appraised value tendered to the

~istrict Court clerk.

An agreement was entered into between
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plaintiff Kingston and Salt Lake City Corporation in May Oi
1976 in which the City paid Kingston $49,000 and assign~

to Kingston any interest it may have had in the insurance
proceeds.

(Ex. A., pp. 79-81).

The Final Order of Condem·

nation was entered on June 29, 1976.

(Ex. A, pp. 101-102),

Before this agreement had been reached with Salt Lake
City, Kingston filed a complaint against defendant Great
Southwest Insurance Company on January 23, 1976,

(R., pp,

2-3) alleging wrongful refusal to pay pursuant to the polir

The question of insurable interest was submitted to the lo·i;
court upon stipulation of the parties and the court held t\:
plaintiff had no insurable interest in the warehouse destro:
and accordingly entered judgment in favor of the defendant.
(R., pp. 89-92).

It is from this judgment that plaintiff

appeals.

97).

(R., p.

nc

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF HAD NO
INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE WAREHOUSE AT
THE TIME OF LOSS.
A.

After Possession is Granted to the Condemning~·

thority and Tender is Made Pursuant to Utah Eminent Dom~
Procedure, An Owner Loses any Insurable Interest in th~·
demned Property.
.

The instant case presents a simple question o
.

f ,.,hether

·

tv whic'.

an owner can claim an insurable interest in proper ,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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i

has been condemned initially by the City but which no final
award has been made.

The answer to this question, however

depends entirely upon the statutory law of Utah relating to
insurable interest and eminent domain.

For this reason,

therefore, this case is unique in that this question has
never been decided in the state of Utah interpreting these
particular statutes.
The critical importance of the statutory procedure was
~cognized

by the court of appeals of Kentucky in Patrick v.

;;

Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 413 S.W.2d 340

i::

(Ct. App. Ky.

1967) when it said:

We have considered the cases cited and have
concluded that it would be pointless to
extend this opinion by detailed discussion
of them.
It is apparent that the statutory
provisions relating to eminent domain of
the particular state involved are largely
responsible for the results reached in these
cases and, therefore, it is necessary that
we consider the problem in the light of the
Kentucky Statutes which are peculiar to the
problem presented and contribute, in large
measure, to the result reached.
Id. at 343.
The applicable insurance statute is as follows.

Section

31 -19-4 of the Insurance Code specifically defines "insurable

interest" in the follm.-ing manner:
1.
No contract of insurance on property
or of any interest therein or arising therefrom, shall be enforceable except for the
benefit of persons having an insurable interest in the thing insured.
2.

"Insurable interest" as used in this
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section means any lawful and substantial
economic inte~est in the safety or preservation of the subject of the insurance
free from loss, destruction, or pecuniary
damage.
This Court has addressed itself to the question of an
"insurable interest" of property destroyed by fire on two
separate occasions.

In Hill v. Safeco Insurance Company,;:

U.2d 96, 448 P.2d 915 (Utah 1969)

this Court quoted with<:-

proval an authority which defined insurable interest of pre·
perty as follows:
Generally speaking, a person has an insurable interest in property whenever he
would profit by or gain some advantage by
its continued existence and suffer some
loss or disadvantage by its destruction.
If he would sustain such loss, it is immaterial whether he has, or has ·not, any
title in, or lien upon, or possession of,
the property itself.
Id. at p. 917, fn.
2 (Emphasis added).
In National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Companyv.
Thompson, 4 U.2d 7, 286 P.2d 249 (Utah 1955) this Court recc:·
nized that such an insurable interest is necessary to preve:.:
a person having no interest in property except a potential
gain from its destruction to gamble upon its loss.
Thus, it is clear what criteria should be used in deter·
mining an insurable interest and why such an interes t must "
shown.

thorouahl.
·

In this particular case it is necessary to

s,...ertai11

examine the eminent domain procedure in order to a ~
the interest which the condemning authority and th(
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

j,,,

in

the condemned property.
Chapter 34 of Title 78 concerns the eminent domain pro-

cedure in Utah.
~inent

Section 78-34-1 defines when the right of

domain may be exercised.

There is no

question in

this case that the condemning of appellant's property was proper under the eminent domain statute.
Section 78-34-6 prescribes what elements the complaint
must contain.
Lake City.

This procedure was strictly followed by Salt

(Exhibit A, pp. 1-3).

Section 78-34-9 is entitled, "Occupancy of Premises
Pending Action" and has been substantially amended in 1967
from the original 1943 version.

The original provision al-

lowed occupancy. of condemned property upon payment of a bond
"not less than double the value of the premises sought to be
condemned and the damages which will ensue from condemnation".
~e original provision spoke in terms of a surety rather than

an actual payment for the property taken.
The amended 1967 section allows occupancy of the premises and permission to perform "such work thereon as may be
required" upon filing with the Clerk of the Court "a sum
equivalent to at least 75 per cent of the condemning authorities' appraised valuation of the property sought to be con-

d~mned ·"
tr~

-.le

The amended statute further provides interest at

rate of 8 per cent per annum to be applied to a formula

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

based upon whether the ultimate award of condemnation is
greater or less than the initial deposit with the Clerk of
the Court.

This statute clearly speaks in terms of an ac-

tual payment for the value of the property since it is assumed the taking of the property has already occurred as
stated in 78-34-11.
In the instant case Judge Croft entered an Order of Immediate Occupancy on August 12, 1975 requiring at least 75
per cent of the appraised value to be paid into the County
Clerk Depository and restraining defendant from interf~i~
with the occupation and work of the premises.

One-hundred

per cent of the appraised value was actually deposited.
Section 78-34-11 concerns when the right to damages ha'"
accrued.

This section states the following:
For the purpose of assessing compensation
and damages, the right thereto shall be
deemed to have accrued at the date of the
service of summons, and its actual value
at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be actually
taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously
affected, in all cases where such damages
are allowed, as provided in the next preceding section.
No improvements put upon
the property subsequent to the date of
service of summons shall be included in
the assessment of compensation or damages.
(Emphasis added) .
l\1t'

This Court in Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City~
Investment Inc., 522 P.2 d 1 370

(Utah 19 74) held that the
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of crmdemned property is to be determined as of the date and
under the circumstances existing at the time of the taking
and that "ordinarily evidence of subsequent occurrences is
not admissible as bearing thereon".

Id. at 1372.

Thus, under this provision Salt Lake City was legally
bound to pay plaintiff Kingston the value of th"' property at
the time the complaint was served (July 14, 1975) regardless
of any subsequent events either adding to or decreasing this
value.
Section 78-34-15 essentially states that a court must
~1ake

a final judgment of condemnation describing the property

condemned and the purpose of such condemnation and that a
copy of this judgment must be filed in the office of the Recorder of the County in which the property is located and
"thereupon the property described therein shall vest in the
plaintiff for the purpose therein specified".
Finally, Section 78-34-16 was substantially amended in
1967 thereby changing the title from "Possession by Plaintiff

Pending Appeal of Further Proceedings--Deposit--Payment,
Effect--" to the new title reading "Occupancy of Premises
Pending Action--Substitution of Bond for Deposit Paid Into
r

'ourt--Abandonment of Action by Condemner".

The new 1967

Deajment added a specific provision concerning the effects

o: obct;-,d 0 nment of the condemnation action by the condemning
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authority.

The new statute states:
Condemner, whether a public or private
body, may, at any time prior to final payment of compensation and damages awarded
the defendant by the court or jury, abandon proceedings and cause the action--"tClbe
dismissed without prejudice, provided, however, that as a condition of dismissal
condemner first compensate condemnee for
all damages he has sustained and also reimburse him in full for all reasonable and
necessary expenses actually incurred by
condamnee because of the filing of the action by·condemnor, including attorney's
fees.
(Emphasis added) .

Applying this statutory scheme of eminent domain

~ fu

facts of this case patently shows that at the til'le of the L
Kingston had no insurable interest in the warehouse propert:.
This conclusion is based on the following analysis.
When Kingston first purchased the property in 1971, hs
obviously had an insurable interest in it since, if the property were to be destroyed, the risk of loss would be borne
entirely by him.
When the summons was served upon Kingston on July 14,
1975 the value which Kingston could claim for the propertj'
was limited to its worth as of that date.
whether the value of the property went up or down subsequen:
to the service of the summons.

At that point in time, it is

doubtful that Kingston had any insurable interest in the ere·
. d the full V3.lue of
perty since he was guaranteed to be Pal

the property thus extinguishing any interest
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'lal'e in it.

However, he still retained the right of posses-

sion and, under some cases of other jurisdictions, could still
claim an insurable interest because of his possessory right.

on August 12, 1975 the Order of Immediate Occupancy was
issued by Judge Croft and on August 14 a tender for the full
amount of the appraised value was made to the Clerk of the
district court.

(Ex. A, pp. 30-33).

At this time, three critical events occurred:

first, a

judicial deterrnina ti on was made as to the value of the property subject to late:::- modification; second, all ric;hts of
possession were lost by Kingston; and third, the risk of loss
i~~ediately

passed to Salt Lake City Corporation.

The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Patrick v. Kentucky
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 413 S.W.2d 340

(Ct. App.

Ky. 1967) explained the significance of this first element

of judicial determination of market value.

In referring to

Kentucky statutes which allow a similar occupancy and payment
into a court fund, the court stated:
Thus, it appears that prior to the destruction of the property, appellant had been
paid an amount of money which represented
a judicial determination of the fair market
value of the insured property. This judicial determination was subject to appeal
as to its amount, but it is also true that
appellant was entitled to and was assured
by operation of law that she would receive
a judicially determined amount of money re0resenting the fair market value of the
~roperty insured.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Since appellant had received a judic al2.:·
determined amount of money represent ng t~e
fair market value of the property pr or tc
its destruction or loss and was not entitled to possession of the property at the
time of this loss, then it would appear fr.a:
she would not have an insurable interest i::
the property.
Id at 343.
As to the second element of possession, even

tf.c1~~'.

:'.= :..

Kingston maintained some of his personal property i::

ing, the possession of the property was deemed to be :'=.: ::
the City.

In City of Rochester v. Greenberg, 244

"1.Y.s.::

(Sup. Ct. 1963), the City had condemned real propert::

a~.:·

obtained an order directing the property owner "to del:'-·o:
surrender possession of the property to the City of
on or before June 30, 1961".

Roe~~

The property owner did r.o: :,.

liver possession and continued to collect rents from :':2 ;::
perty.

Subsequently, the building collapsed.

The City con tended that the owner rer..a ined in poss 0:0:
and control of the property and, therefore, that the cc::;:·
valuation date was after the property had colla~sed.
York Court disagreed.

-·-

The Court in that case stated:

I have concluded that the city in fact had
possession on and after that date although
Mrs. Greenberg collected the rents and I
have concluded that the rents she did collect in fact are the property of the city
and must be by her returned to the city.
Id. at 424.
Thus, the Order of Immediate Occupancy shifted
to possession to the city and at the same tiwe ~aJ~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12_

t~' 0

::·

_ -=-=
;. .. .... -

:.e:.:.::t a.t will subject ccmp.ietely to the control of

~

_:1.

si.--:iilar situation occurred in Van Cure v. Hart-

I:.surance Comoany, 253 A.2d 663

(Pa. 1969).

In

o=.se, t'."le condemning authority initiated a complaint
o:?.:;.s:: i:':'1 e ,:rope:::ty owner and obtained a
::~e

-.;

condemning aut!l.ori ty to enter the premises and take

::ssess1on.
.~:o

court order allow-

_;;t the same time, it tendered a $37 ,000 bond

t!"',e clerk's depository.

The authority permitted the

;::o;:ert•; owner to remain in possession in order to reduce de:s;.::on

>.e

d~:.ages.

A fire destroyed the premises subsequently.

cou:ri:, in addressing its elf to the possessory interest of

:':s ;:rc:_=erty owner, stated the following:
As for any other legal interest in appellant, the only plausibl~ argument made is
that her right of possession was interrupted by the fire.
However, this right was
not enforceable since she remained at the
will of the Authority who could have her
removed at any time.
The Authority allowed her to remain in possession only because
it suited its financial interests by reducing detention damages, and no court could
order the Authority to continue her possession.
Consequently, appellant possessed
no legally enforceable interest that could
support the policies of insurance.
Id. at
666.

T1 e ~hird effect of the order of occupancy was an immediate
:ie risk o= loss.

The city under the statutory frame-

•·.

~. '. :: :::n2.:;.e:1t domain became responsible for the property con~t~

right of possession.

In Chester Litho., Inc.
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v. Palisades Interstate Park Commission, 317 N.Y.S.2d 761
(Ct. App. N.Y. 1971), a building was condemned by the Park
Commission but the occupants were allowed to remain.

Under

the laws of New York, an order of irnmediate occupancy was r.c:
required since the title passed upon the filing of the actic
While the court relied upon the passing of title as its ba·
sis for the decision in that case, the language shows ili&
the passing of the right to possession also transfers the

rt

The court stated:
If this were a sale in fact, the risk
would be upon the purchaser, here the appellants, under either the Uniform Vendor
Purchaser Risk Act • • • or the common law.
Pursuant to the more stringent statutory
provision, the risk passes with either title or possession.
No unfair burden is placed upon appellants,
for, if they intend to utilize a condemned
building, they have an insurable interest
for their protection.
Id. at 762-763.
The court consequently held that the risk of loss of the bu:
ing which was destroyed by fire was entirely borne by the cc
demnor-appellant.

This is in accord with California law wr,;:

states that the risk of loss to improvements remain on tne
owner until title, possession, or the right to possession::
transferred to the condemnor.

California Law Review

C~

·

and:•

Recornmendation and Study Relating to Taking Possession.::::.---,

b

1960,.

sage of Title in Eminent Domain Proceedings, Octa er~
B-17; see also Van Cure v. Hartford Fire

Insura~~,-~_0'.f'.£~~
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.

d 663 (Pa. 1969)

·'· 2

(After bond is filed, all risk of loss

of condemned property passes to condemnor).

A further consequence occurred as a result of the Order
of Immediate Occupancy.

From that point on, Salt Lake City

corporation became responsible for the property, even in the
event the condemnation proceeding was later abandoned.

Sec-

tion 78-34-16 allows abandonment, but specifically requires
the condemnor to compensate the owner for all damages sustained because of the condemnation.

Obviously, had the pro-

ceeding been subsequently abandoned, the city could not return
to Kingston a burned out building without compensating him
for his loss.
This Court on two occasions has held that a condemner
is liable for any damages occurring during the time of the
condemnation when a subsequent abandonment has occurred.

As

stated by this Court:
The majority of the decisions hold that
the rule that a municipality is not liable for damages sustained by the property
owner resulting from the institutions of
condemnation proceedings which are subsequently abandoned does not apply in instances of actual damage to the freehold,
or when the condemnor takes possession of
the property. Moyle v. Salt Lake City,
176 P.2d 882, 885 (Utah 1947) (Emphasis
added).
See _also N
=-2.rth Salt Lake v. Saint Joseph Water and Irrigation
-

~n:, 233 P.?d 577 (Utah 1950).
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This position is consistent with cases in other juris.
dictions having similar statutes concerning abandonment, ;.
City of Silverton v. Porter, 559 P.2d 1297 (Ct. App, Ore.
1977), the court stated "A condemner which takes prejudgmer,,
possession of property and subsequently elects to abandon
its condemnation action is liable in damages to the condern.1,
both for loss of use of the land and for physical injuries
thereto."
P.2d 929

See also Johnson v. Climax Molybdenum Company, i:.
(Colo. 1942); Van Cure v. Hartford Fire Insurance

Company, 253 A.2d 663, 667

(Pa. 1969).

("Appellant contena:

that since she may have her property returned to her, she
an interest in the preservation of that property.
in two respects.

She em

After a bond is filed, all risk of loss

passes to the condemner.

If the Authority is to return the

property, i t must make her whole with respect to any damage:
and losses.

Thus, appellant could not sustain any pecuniar

loss."); 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain, Section 339, p. 271.
Thus, it is obvious that the Order of Immediate Occupa'
had pri:·
eliminated any insurable interest Kingston may have
to the entry of the order.

The value that Kingston was to:

ceive for the property was fixed regardless of whether the
·
d or d es t roye d .
property was improve

The fi' re could haven'

effect upon the ultimate condemnation award.
Likewise, while Kingston may have been using
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

the buJJ;:

as a "shelter and protection for the merchandise inside"

(Ap-

pellant • s brief, p. 12) , such shelter is certainly not within
the "substantial economic interest" requirement of the stat~e.

His only economic interest was in the property con-

tained in the building which was not insured under this policy.

To hold otherwise would allow a tenant to insure his

landlord's building or a trespasser to insure a building in
which he sleeps at night.

Such insignificant "interests" do

not give rise to a recovery from insurance.
Finally, even had the entire condemnation proceeding
~~abandoned,

Section 78-34-16 of the Utah Code specifi-

cally requires the condemning authority to make the owner
whole once again.

It goes without saying that Salt Lake City

could not have abandoned the condemnation proceeding and
turned the ruined building back to Kingston without compensating him for its diminished value.
The criteria enumerated in the Hill case by this Court
that a person must profit by or gain some advantage by the
building's continued existence or suffer some loss or di sadvantage by its destruction is applicable to Kingston and his
interest ·
h
in t e warehouse building.

Kingston had neither

cotential
.
gain nor potential loss.
·
At the time of the fire, Kingston's only claim to the

'"~~'""

Wc1c,

~

bare legal title.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-
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--13) .

But as this court stated in the Hill case, " [I] t is

immaterial whether he has.
itself."
917 fn.

.

. any title in.

. . the propert\

Hill v. Safeco Insurance Company, 448 P.2d 91S,
2.

The Kentucky Court of Appeals likewise stated:
It is true that at the time of the destruction of the insured property, appellant
had a legal title to it, but the fact that
the name insured had a legal title to the
insured property is not conclusive of the
existence of insurable interest as the trial
court correctly discerned as evidenced by
its citation of Cook's Adm'r. v. Franklin
Fire Insurance Company, 224 Ky. 360, 6 S.W.2d
477.
Patrick v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company, 414 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Ct.
App . Ky. 19 6 7 ) .

Kingston's legal title to the property was immaterial.
For example, unlike a vendor who holds such title as a secur·
ity interest in the property and who is entitled to insure
his interest until such time as he is obligated to convey le·
gal title, Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial District Court, Sli
P.2d 739

(Utah 1973), Kingston had no security interest in

the property.

He had already been paid the assessed value o:

the property and could only argue that he was entitled to
more money.

There was no continued contract in which he ha:

any right to reclaim the property as in a real estate ~~~
ment or a mortgage.

Likewise, had the

. ty
Cl

abandoned the :r:·

perty, he would have been returned to his original condit'.c:
and compensated for any damage done during the
again did not require any security interest to

interim whi::
b'."
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tielcl '·

legal title.
Therefore, an analysis of the specific facts and sta:utes in this case amply supports the trial court's conclu3100

that plaintiff Kingston had no insurable interest in

:he warehouse at the time the fire occurred.

B.

The Authorities Cited By Plaintiff Are Generally

Distinguishable Upon The Facts Or Statutory Laws.
As noted earlier in this brief, the particular statutory
scheme upon which a decision is based is of crucial importance in this type of case.

A cursory reading of the authori-

ties cited by plaintiff may give the impression that this
exact problem now facing this court has been decided in a
number of jurisdictions in favor of plaintiff's position.
However, a close analysis of these cases generally reveals
distinguishing facts or statutory law which make these authorities inapplicable.

It should be reiterated once again that

llie question presented on this appeal has never been decided
under Utah statutes by this Court and, therefore, cases in
other jurisdictions cited by both sides or cases of this Court
in previous decisions may or may not be helpful.
The Hill v. Safeco Insurance Company case cited by Ap?ellant (Appellant's brief, p. 4) has already been cited by
'le

· spondent in this brief as defining the standard to be applied
'1'

...:i

-· ~eter~lning whether an insurable interest exists.

A close
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examination of the facts in Hill show that there was a substantial interest in the preservation of the building by t.'.,
insured far beyond anything claimed by the plaintiff Kingst:
and his interest in the warehouse which was destroyed,

In

Hil 1, the insured-deceased, through whom the estate claimed
the insurable interest, had deeded the building (his house)
to his wife.

By will, his wife gave the insured a life es-

tate in the home.

This Court found:

[H]e had a life estate therein established
by a will executed by Lila, a right of occupancy of the premises and a few other little unmentionable incorporeal hereditaments.
448 P.2d at 916.
Here, the plaintiff Kingston had none of the rights found i.··
portant by this Court in the Hill case.

Kingston had no li:

estate in the warehouse, in fact, he had no estate whatsoevE:
he had no right of occupancy to the premises as the right
existed entirely with the city pursuant to the court order.
The Stuart case decided by this Court and cited by -~Pf'lant (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-5) involved the interpretati:
of Utah statutes concerning the transfer of automobile titk
This Court found that the sellers of the automobile had fai>
to comply with the requirements of the statute con

cernincr ;;.
'

and that therefore the heirs retained an interest in the ca:
since it had not been legally sold.

In this case, however,
,

the eminent domain statutes have been ccmpl1ed

. th ~nd
Wl . w ·
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J-k

2 ~try
s~n

of the Order of Immediate Occupancy transferred possesof the building and risk of loss to the city, thereby

orecluding any insurable interest of Kingston.

For this rea-

son, the Stuart case dealing with an automobile is not relevant to the interpretation of the eminent domain procedure.
The Thompson case cited by Appellant (Appellant's brief,
pp. 5-6) is the only case decided by this Court as to the

interpretation of the insurable interest statute.

A close

reading of the Thompson case shows that Thompson was in a
fu different position than plaintiff Kingston in the present

case.

In Thompson, there were numerous facts representing

"a substantial economic interest" that are not present in the
instant case.
(1)

The insured in Thompson had:
Obtained an agreement with the new owner for

retaining possession of the buildings.
(2)

The insured had obligated himself to the new

owner to protect the buildings from loss.
(3)

Both the insured and the new owner expected that

the use of the building would be paid for by the insured-prior

owner.
(4)
t~e

sal

The insurance company had been made aware of

.
.
.
e and agreed to accept the renewal premium in the in-

sured' s name.

~:Jrnoa::ing the elements of "interest" in Thompson to the
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elements of "interest" in Kingston we see they are substar.·
tially different.

In Thompson, there was an agreement to:

cupy the premises, but in this case, there was an
vesting possession.

orderd~

In Thompson the insured had a duty to

protect and pay rent while in this case there was
obligation to protect nor any offer to pay.

neither~

In Thompson

t~.'

insurance company knew of the change of ownership and agree:
to continue coverage--here there was no such knowledge on:.·.
part of defendant.

The defendant-respondent submits that t'

only interest plaintiff Kingston had in the warehouse was

l:

the insurance proceeds should the warehouse be destroyed by
fire.

Such an interest does not constitute an insurable i:·

terest under Section 31-19-4 Utah Code Annotated.
The respondent submits that the Thompson case is despositive of the present situation and clearly sets for~~
purpose of the statute requiring "insurable interest", the
purpose being that public policy does not allow an individ'"
to gamble upon the destruction of something that he has no:·
terest in.

If such were not the requirement underlying the

principle of insurable interest, it would always be to a cor:
.
.
d troyed b1'
demnee's benefit to see his condemned building es
·
fire.
The

Irwin

case cited by Appellant (Appellant

p. 7) is distinguishable on the fact that the cas~
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15

bne'.-

~~

abatement of a nuisance--not a condemnation of a building

,,nth just compensation.

In addition, the insurance company

:iad fUll knowledge of the court orders abating the nuisance

brt continued the policy in effect.

In the instant case, the

p?:operty was only taken after compensation was paid for it
a~d

there is no evidence that the insurance company was aware

that the building had been condemned.
The Rosenbloom case (Appellant's brief, p. 7) reaches
its result based upon one section of the New York Insurance
~a·,.;

and one section of the New York Real Property Law.

rtrtutes

Both

concern the sale of property by contract and the

effects such contracts have upon fire insurance and risk of
Since these statutes do not concern condemnation nor

loss.

are similar Utah statutes involved in the present case, the
cited authority is inapplicable.
Likewise, Illinois statutes were at issue in the American
clational Bank case relied upon by Appellant (Appellant's brief,
~. Bl·

The city had filed a petition for condemnation, but

:lad made no tender of the purchase price nor obtained any order of possession.

The Illinois statute only required the pay-

~ent of the property owner's expenses for an abandonment to
occur and did not require damages to be paid for any loss·

cJch statutes and procedure is once again inapplicable to the

-::cntr'Jversy.
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The Virginia statutory scheme in Home Insurance com pa
v. Dalis referred to by Appellant is also distinguishable.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10).

Under Virginia law, acer+:

ficate is filed estimating the value of the property to be
condemned.

The parties then have sixty days to agree toa

fair price before an actual condemnation proceeding has bee
No judicial determination whatsoever had been made in the
Dalis case at the time the fire occurred.

The court

~l~

upon the fact that any condemnation action could be nullifi;
and therefore held that even though title under the Virgin:;
statute had originally passed upon the filing of the cert1·
ficate, the fact that it was defeasible kept the risk ofk
with the property owner.

The court in that case stated:

Until the right of the State Highway Commissioner to have the certificate invalidated
and to abandon the condemnation proceeding
had expired, the plaintiffs would have a pecuniary interest in protecting the buildings
against loss by fire.
Thus, plaintiffs had
an interest in the buildings that they needed to protect against loss, and they had an
insurable interest in them when they were
destroyed by fire.
141 S.E.2d at 724.

These statutes are, of course, d i. ff erent from the Utah stat:
b

where no such loss would have occurred even ha d a an

donment

taken place because of the obligation to compensate the
for damages.
Finally, the Oregon case of Fenter v.

-24-
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~ire

and Life Assurance Corporation, is also distinguishable

upon its facts,

The case involved the sale of real property

for a failure to pay taxes and had nothing to do with condemnation proceedings.

The trial court sustained a demurrer

to the complaint wholly as a matter of law holding that the
~laintiffs

failed to show any interest in the property des-

troyed at the time of the fire.

The Oregon Supreme Court held

that there was a possibility that the plaintiff had been darnaged from the fire, but stated it could not measure the probabilit:,r of such loss from the mere allegations of the cornplaint.

The court concluded, "He should have an opportunity

to prove what he stood to lose, and what loss he actually
suffered, as a result of the· fire."

484 P.2d at 314.

This same question might be asked in the instant case.
;vhat evidence is there that Kingston stood to lose anything
or actually suffered a loss as a result of the fire.

It is

evident from the statutory eminent domain procedure that Kings~n could suffer no loss whatsoever regardless of the build-

ing' s fate.
Finally, the remaining arguments of Appellant should be
answered.

Appellant states that a double recovery is per-

~issible since defendant insurance company agreed to insure
~~e

build·
ing and that disallowing a claim by plaintiff would

~mount tc. a " .vindf all" to the insurance company by allowing
1
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it to "avoid payment for a loss which it voluntarily · ,
lnour;:
against."

(Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14) .

It should be n:·.

however, that unlike the Thompson case, there is no eviden:
that the defendant insurance company was aware that the bui.
ing had been condemned.

Thus, it is hardly fair to say t:,a-

the company had accepted premiums to insure the condemned
building and now was trying to avoid its obligation.

The

policy was issued on May 10, 1975, over three months befor:
the condemnation proceedings began.
Additionally, the plaintiff argues that had it not bee:
for the anticipated insurance settlement in this case, plai:.·
tiff would not have settled for the amount finally agreed
with the City.

(Appellant's brief, p. 13).

must be termed incredible.

This argument

Plaintiff initiated this lawsur

against defendant Great Southwest Fire Insurance Company
January 23, 1976.

t:

(R., pp. 2-3).

0

~

Some five months later,

while this action was still pending and while defendant in·
surance company had still refused to make any payment on t):
claim, plaintiff settled with Salt Lake City stipulating t'.i::
it was "a reasonable settlement for the value of the p::oper:
sought to be condemned."
that the city assigned any

(Exhibit A, pp. 79-80).
l.

nterest

i· t

The fact

may have in the fire

insurance policy certainly does not indicate that the amo'n:
hoped for insun·
settled upon was reduced in any Way by the
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proceeds.

It is ludicrous to assume that respondent is re-

sponsible for any settlement agreed upon by plaintiff which
was less than the actual value of the property.

Had plain-

tiff sincerely believed he was entitled to more money, he

could have litigated his beliefs in the condemnation action.
rt must, therefore, be assumed just as the stipulation states,

that the $48,500 paid to plaintiff was indeed a "reasonable
settlement."
CONCLUSION
Without extensively reviewing the numerous authorities
cited by both sides in this controversy, it can be simply
said that plaintiff Kingston neither suffered nor could suffer any loss from the destruction of the warehouse building.
The statutory procedure of eminent domain adequately protects a property owner from loss and places the burden upon
the condemning authority especially after an Order of Occupancy has been obtained.
To allow the recovery to plaintiff in this case would
amount to a true "windfall" since plaintiff has already been
fully compensated for the complete value of the building.

While it is true that courts generally construe po 1 icies
· ·
against the

i·

·
d,
nsurance company and in favor of t h e insure

i' t

·
is also t rue that courts must adhere to the public
policy of
;nsurabl<> ; ..1
~

"'

.

terest in order to prevent a wagering on disaster
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